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LEAD

FEATURE

A Jurisprudence of Ideology
ChiefJustice Rehnquist was not the simple anti-environmentaljurist ofhis caricature. But his
adherence to several tenets ofMovement Conservative ideology often produced the same resultsunless he was defending state resource protectionfrom federal encroachment or out-ofstate waste
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hiefJustice William Rehnquist is a
towering figure in environmental
law, for more than three decades
uniquely situated on the Supreme
Court to guide the law's development. Coming to the Court two
years after Earth Day and serving as chief from 1986 until his death in 2005, he
wrote more opinions in environmental cases, as
well as in cases on federal lands and waters, than
any other justice. He also participated in an unprecedented number of cases challenging state and local
land use laws designed to protect the environment.
Surveying this vast body of jurisprudence produces
an apparent contradiction. Rehnquist adhered to
an ideological legal philosophy aligned with Movement Conservatism - the belief which came into
its ascendancy during the Reagan administration,
that government's role is protecting property rights
and unfettered free markets rather than intervening in economic affairs to achieve social policy goals
- that has significantly undermined federal and

Robert L. Glicksman is Robert W WagstaffProfessorofLau/ at the
University ofKansas. James R. May is ProfessorofLaw at Widener
University. This article is based on research that willproduce an extensive
study ofJustice Rehnquist's environmental law jurisprudence.
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state environmental policies and will hamper future
environmental protection efforts. While his jurisprudential ideology served to undermine environmental law, however, this outcome was most likely
not his purpose.
What Rehnquist wrote and not just how
he voted - reveals that he used three ideological
guideposts as the basis for his reasoning on environmental cases, all of which became the basis of
significant challenges to environmental regulation:
limiting the scope of federal power, protecting
state sovereignty from encroachment by the federal
government, and protecting the rights of private
property owners against intrusions resulting from
regulation by all levels of government. Though each
component had the effect of undermining modern
environmental law, Rehnquist was not ideologically hostile to environmental initiatives per see His
southwestern roots exposed him to the wisdom of
protecting natural resources. He believed that environmental protection fell within the sphere of the
states' traditional power, and assiduously supported
- most often alone and in dissent - state environmental laws designed to protect natural resources
from degradation by out-of-state sources. Moreover, he was reluctant to find state environmental
laws preempted by federal law lacking convincing
evidence of preemptive intent by Congress.
At the same time, Rehnquist was deeply critical
of the federal legislative and regulatory underpinnings of modern environmental law. And despite
his general support of state efforts to protect natural
resources, he almost always concluded that states
should compensate landowners whenever their
environmental laws restricted the use of private
property, a stance that severely restricted the vestigial environmental import of his pro-states-rights
ideology.

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1444048

Limiting Federal Power
ehnquist's ideological aversion to expansive federal authority led him to use
a number of tools to restrict Congress's
power to protect the environment. In
particular, he supported the recognition
of limits on Congress's authority to legislate under
the Commerce Clause. Because the clause provides
the constitutional underpinning of most federal environmentallegislation, those limits would impair
the Legislative Branch's ability to enact strong environmental protection measures and the Executive
Branch's ability to implement them.
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association (1981)., Rehnquist concurred in a
decision upholding Congress's authority to require
mining companies operating on private intrastate
land to clean up and restore sites under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. But he
sounded an ominous note of caution, famously observing that although "one could easily get the sense
from this Court's opinions that the federal system
exists only at the sufferance of Congress . . . there
are constitutional limits." In Solid mzste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. U. S. Army Corps ofEngineers (2001), he rejected the federal government's

position that the Clean Water Act authorizes federal regulation of intrastate, isolated waters on the
ground that they provide habitat for migratory
birds. Although he based that conclusion on statutory interpretation, Rehnquist supported his narrow reading of the act based on his conviction that
any effort by Congress to rely on the Commerce
Clause to regulate intrastate waters would raise "significant constitutional questions."
He was not skeptical of all sources of legislative
power to protect the environment. Perhaps feeling
that the federal government has the same property
rights as a private owner, he never raised an eyebrow
when assessing the breadth of Congress's authority
under the Constitution's Property Clause "to make
all needful rules and regulations" to govern property
belonging to the United States. Congress uses this
authority to manage federally owned lands such as
national parks and forests.
Rehnquist also urged the expansion of the nondelegation doctrine, an outgrowth of the constitutional provision vesting "all legislative powers"
in Congress. Restrictions on legislative ability to
delegate power to expert executive agencies such as
EPA would impair the federal government's capacity to implement environmental legislation properly grounded in the Commerce Clause. Rehnquist
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generally took the position that congressional delegation of tough decisions about environmental and
other social matters to unelected, mission-oriented
agencies like EPA amounts to an improper abdication of Congress's core power to legislate. He strove
mightily, at least for a time, to reinvigorate the doctrine. In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Institute (1980; also known as
the Benzene case), for example, a plurality of the
Court invalidated a standard designed to protect
workers from the health risks of exposure to benzene that had been adopted by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, concluding that
OSHA misinterpreted the scope of its statutory
authority. Rehnquist concurred with the plurality,
though he would have found that an aspect of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act itself was invalid because of the unbounded discretion afforded
the agency in the statutory decree that it set workplace safety standards "to the extent feasible." He
believed that it is the job of Congress, not the Executive, to weigh the divergent social values necessary to determine the feasible level of exposure to
dangerous chemicals in the workplace.
But he seemed to abandon his quest to reinvigorate the doctrine toward the end of his tenure. In
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations (2001),
the Court unanimously rejected a non-delegation
challenge to Congress's charge to the agency under the Clean Air Act to set ambient air quality
standards that are "requisite" to protect the public
health. Despite the similarity between the words
"feasible" in the OSH Act and "requisite" in the
CAA, Rehnquist joined Justice Antonin Scalia's majority opinion, which held that the CAA delegation
falls "comfortably within" the range of permissible
delegation established by the Court's past non-delegation precedents.
Finally, Rehnquist regularly interpreted the
scope of environmental statutes narrowly, especially
those administered by EPA, lowering their degree
of protection. Indeed, he generally declined to defer to EPA's statutory interpretations, even though
the Court during his tenure often emphasized the
obligation of judges to defer to administrative interpretations and the impropriety of judicial usurpation of the authority of the elected branches of
government. Rehnquist was clearly frustrated with
how Congress composed environmental laws. For
example, he complained in United States Steel Corp.
v. EPA (1980) that the CMs requirements "virtually swim before one's eyes." In Harrison v. PPG In-
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dustries (1980), he felt obliged to resort to canons
of statutory construction, congressional purposes,
and legislative history to interpret the same act, bemoaning that "the effort to determine congressional
intent here might better be entrusted to a detective
than to a judge." In Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United
~

\J

not at
at EPA due to its effort to expand its own regulatory
authority. In adopting a narrow construction of the
CAA, Rehnquist maintained that the act's criminal
liability provisions "did not empower [EPA], after
the manner of Humpty Dumpty in Through the
Looking-Glass, to make a regulation an 'emission
standard' by . . . mere designation."
Rehnquist's near universal tendency to interpret
statutesnarrowly led him to reject implied private
rights of action and to deny litigants' entitlement
to attorneys fees in environmental cases. The result
was a weakening of environmental enforcement.
An example is California v. Sierra Club (1981), in
which the Court held that the Rivers and Harbors
Act does not provide an implied private right of action to enforce the statute. Rehnquist concurred,
emphasizing the lack of any statutory language or
legislative history evidencing that Congress intended to endorse such an action. The court could not
recognize implied rights of action absent "clear and
manifest" congressional intent to allow them. Yet
Rehnquist was willing to ignore what appears to be
"clear and manifest" legislative intent in Ruckelshaus
v. Sierra Club (1983). Writing for a 5-4 majority, he
swept aside the plain meaning of the CAA allowing
the federal courts in citizen suits to award attorneys
fees "as appropriate." Instead, he invoked the so'-..J'-J' ...... s;;.,..a.""vv,

called "American rule," which requires parties to
bear their own costs in all cases. He reached this
conclusion barring the exercise of judicial discretion in assessing whether fee-shifting is "appropriate," despite key passages in the act's legislative history that show that Congress envisioned a regime
different from the one governed by the American
Rule.
Rehnquist's proclivity for narrow interpretations
of the environmental statutes was so strong that he
adhered to it in the face of agency interpretations
that conflicted with those he adopted. In SWANCC,
he rejected EPA's (and the Corps of Engineers') expansive interpretation of the CWA's dredge and fill
permit program. In several cases arising under the
CAA, he also made short shrift of EPXs construction of the statute.
This inclination is perhaps best illustrated in his
interpretations of the National Environmental Policy Act. NEPA is procedural- it requires agencies
to consider environmental impacts in advance of
taking action and to disclose the results. But ever
since President Nixon signed NEPA in 1970, many
had hoped it would be interpreted to create an additional substantive mandate that agencies make
decisions that promote environmental protection.
At every opportunity presented to him, however,
Rehnquist adopted the most restrictive reading of
the law. In Strycker's Bay (1980), he definitively de-

nied
substantive
In
seminal Vermont Yankee case (1978), Rehnquist put an
abrupt halt to the efforts of the lower federal courts
to impose on agencies procedural obligations more
rigorous than those derived from the Administra-

tive Procedure Act and stressed the "limited" nature
of judicial review of alleged noncompliance with
NEPA.
To be sure, Rehnquist purported in each of his
NEPA opinions to simply be adhering to congressional intent. His uniformly parsimonious interpretations of the statute's scope, however, coupled
with his narrow constructions of other federal environmental laws, at least raise the suspicion that
Rehnquist relished the opportunity to relegate
NEPA to the role of a grandiloquent-sounding but
ultimately meaningless paper pushing exercise.

Promoting Federalism
• • •-he second component of Rehnquist's jurisprudential ideology was his dedication
to the preservation of state sovereignty.
Rehnquist pursued this goal in cases involving applications ofthe dormant Commerce Clause, the Eleventh Amendment, and, less
uniformly, the Supremacy Clause. He also sought
to protect state sovereignty through the mechanism
of statutory interpretation of federal environmental
laws and through interpretations of the appropriate
scope of federal common law and the equal footing
doctrine.
Rehnquist's commitment to state sovereignty is
less one-sided in its impact on the fate of environmental protection measures than his pursuit of a
federal government of limited powers. His jurisprudence under the dormant Commerce Clause,
for example, is apt to protect state initiatives to
prevent degradation of state resources by external
threats. Yet Rehnquist's ideological commitment
to the protection of inviolate state sovereignty had
the capacity in other contexts to diminish modern
environmental law by tipping the scales in favor of
differentiated state solutions to what appear to be
problems that demand a national solution.
The Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause
not just to delegate to Congress the power to regulate activities in interstate commerce, but also to
prevent states from enacting laws that discriminate
against out-of-state economic interests - the dormant Commerce Clause. Rehnquist categorically
rejected using this "negative implication" of the
Commerce Clause to thwart state environmental
laws, and categorically dissented from the Court's
repeated invalidation of state efforts to protect land
and resources from environmental degradation due
to external threats. For example, in City of Phila-
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delphia v. New Jersey (1976), he dissented when the
Court struck a state natural resource protection law
that banned imports of out-of-state solid waste. In
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources (1992), Rehnquist dissented from the majority's holding that a state law
requiring source separation and shipment to county
transfer stations constituted illegitimate economic
protectionism. In his dissent in Chemical Wtzste
Management v. Hunt (1992), Rehnquist chided his
brethren for failing to "acknowledge that a safe and
attractive environment is the commodity really at
issue in cases such as this, [and that] states may take
actions -legirimarely directed at the preservation of
the state's natural resources."
Some of Rehnquist's preemption decisions also
rebut the thesis that his opinions were inevitably
anti-environmental in character; instead, his concern may have been protecting state sovereignty,
regardless of the consequences for environmental
protection initiatives. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
State Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Commission (1983), Rehnquist voted with a unanimous Court to uphold California's moratorium on
the construction of new nuclear power plants due
to the state's concerns about the economic impact
of long-term storage of radioactive wastes. Other
preemption opinions, however, have an anti-environmental slant. In Midlantic National Bank v.
New Jersey Department ofEnvironmental Protection
(1986), the majority upheld a state environmental
law that forbade parties who file for bankruptcy
protection from abandoning hazardous properties.
Rehnquist, in dissent, concluded that Congress
intended for the "abandonment" provisions of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code to preempt state law.
The most consistently anti-environmental tool
in Rehnquist's arsenal of constitutional mechanisms to protect state sovereignty was his use of
the 11th Amendment, which he interpreted as
prohibiting Congress from abrogating state sovereign immunity by permitting private parties to sue
states. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. (1989),
Rehnquist dissented from a majority opinion upholding the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act insofar as it permitted suits against
the states for monetary damages in federal court.
Seven years later, he wrote the majority opinion in
Seminole Tribe ofFlorida v. Florida (1996), which
overruled Union Gas and held that Congress may
not abrogate sovereign immunity without the
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consent of the state being sued. This result has created obstacles to the pursuit of citizen suits to redress violations of the federal environmental laws
by states and state agencies. It has also hampered
implementation of federal whistleblower laws designed to protect state employees who report a

Rehnquist relied heavily on statutory construction to protect state sovereignty as well as to limit
federal power, most often engendering results not
favorable to environmental protection goals. In
SWANCC: he found that the Corps's attempt to
regulate waters frequented by migratory birds under
the CWA's dredge and fill permit program exceeded the bounds of the agency's statutory authority.
Rehnquist rejected all contrary evidence, including
the Conference Report's statement of Congress's
"intenjt] that the term 'navigable waters' be given
the broadest possible constitutional interpretation."
Accepting the Corps's interpretation, he asserted,
"would result in a significant impingement of the
states' traditional and primary power over land and
water use."
In the natural resources law context, Rehnquist
generally supported a narrow application of the
equal footing doctrine, which provides that when
states are admitted to the Union they acquire the
same jurisdiction over lands within their borders
underlying navigable waters as the original 13 states.
Rehnquist's narrow application of the doctrine expanded the range of circumstances in which state
rather than federal law controls the development
of submerged lands, often facilitating development

of the resources in question. In Minnesota v. Mille
Lac Band ofChippewa Indians (1999), he dissented
from the majority's holding that tribal usufructuary
rights to hunt and fish survived Minnesota's admission. According to Rehnquist, those rights conflicted with state sovereignty and, pursuant to the equal
footing doctrine, did not survive statehood.

Protecting Private Property

-"-he final prong of Rehnquist's jurisprudential ideology was protecting private property rights. His sympathy for the plight
of property owners adversely affected by
regulation was evident in his opinions on
both constitutional and statutory issues. He was
among the justices most amenable to claims that
government regulation required the payment ofjust
compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. He also interpreted federal legislation
to maximize protection of private property.
Rehnquist's opinions uniformly found that state
efforts to protect land and resources constituted a
regulatory taking. He wrote the majority opinion
in Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994), holding that an
exaction requiring a landowner to dedicate property for use as a drainage easement and a pedestrian
and bicycle pathway, was a taking. He wrote dissenting opinions in three other cases, Penn Central

and a regional effort to halt land development temporarily pending the adoption of a comprehensive
land use plan. He argued that the Court should
define the property interest adversely affected by
regulation more narrowly than the majority was
willing to do when it assessed the degree of the adverse economic impact caused by regulation. He
also took a narrow view of the Court's exception
to the rule that a regulation whose effect is a complete deprivation of all economically viable use is a
per se taking. He argued that the exception should
be limited to those property uses that traditionally
qualify as nuisances under state common law, and
does not include more modern forms of disfavored
uses recognized by judges or enacted by state or local legislatures.
Rehnquist resolved clashes between protection
of state sovereignty and private property in favor
of the latter, and, in doing so, made it more difficult for state and local governments to control
land use with potentially damaging environmental
consequences without compensating affected property owners. He took the position in Keystone, for
example, that the scope of the nuisance exception
is governed by federal rather than state law, subject
to independent scrutiny by the federal courts. A
lack of deference to state legislative findings on the
harmful character of the regulated use can enhance
the protection of private property rights. Similarly,
in his later years on the Court, Rehnquist seemed
more willing to allow federal courts to assume jurisdiction over cases in which landowners asserted
takings claims, even before the state courts had definitively ruled that compensation was not allowed
under state law.

.......he ideological posItIons William Rehn-

(1
concluding that the Court erred in refusing to
characterize as regulatory takings the applications
of a local landmarks preservation law, a state statute restricting coal mining that causes subsidence,

quist took in his opinions addressing environmental issues have left a lasting legacy. They will likely influence the way current and future justices, judges, scholars,
and policymakers construe environmental law for
decades. Was limiting the scope of federal power,
protecting state sovereignty from the encroachment
of the federal government, and protecting the rights
of private property owners evidence of an anti-environmental agenda? The record offers no firm conclusion. But William Rehnquist's jurisprudence of
ideology will remain a force in restricting the ability
of all levels of government to protect the environment for many years to come. ~
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